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Introduction
Among the many replacements offered for Freud's much criticized
metapsychology, those based on linguistics are especially popular. But
are they adequate to the task? Peterfreund (1971), Ricoeur (1970), Schafer
(1976), and many others have agreed in their rejection of Freud's eco-
nomic point of view. They have disagreed, however, about its replace-
ment. Relative latecomers to the dispute are those who hold that semi-
otics, or the general theory of sign production, is the theory most likely
to succeed Freud's defunct treatises on psychic energy.:j: Among these
contemporary authors is Colin Martindale (1975), whose work I shall
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analyze, not only to underscore its merits and, by extension, those of
the semiotic option in general, but also to point out some of its limi-
tations.
Linguistics and semiotics are attractive alternatives to Freud's meta-
psychology because they appear to offer access to secrets of language
and, therefore, to the very core of human existence. One can imagine
four powerful motives for the attraction of this alternative. First, lan-
guage is infinitely variable and plastic. As Freud (1920) notes in his
famous account of the child's game of "fort" and "da," language has
the magical power of making what was lost reappear. Second, language
appears to be one of the distinctive features of humans. Although there
are vociferous claims to the contrary, the ruling consensus among ex-
perimentalists is that no animals manifest true language capacity. If
language is unique to human beings, it follows that a linguistic meta-
psychology will preserve that uniqueness. Third, discoveries about
language may be made through the usually despised mode of intro-
spection. Austin's (1970) contributions to ordinary language philoso-
phy and general semantics are a result of his thought experiments on
what a person will say in a particular circumstance. A linguistic meta-
psychology leaves open the possibility of similar explorations pursued
outside both the clinical dyad and the experimental situation. Fourth,
because psychoanalysis is in part the talking cure, a linguistic meta-
psychology has an immediate advantage in explaining how mere words
can effect profound changes in human behavior.
However, there are hidden costs that should be examined before
agreeing to the wholesale purchase of a linguistic metapsychology.
One of these costs is that a linguistic or semiotic metapsychology is
unable to account for the central discovery of psychoanalysis-the real-
ity of repression. This deficiency is reflected in Martindale's attempt
to forge a beginning semiotic metapsychology.
Martindale's Proposal
Martindale (1975) states, "It is argued that the nature of translation
among levels of primary- and secondary-process sign systems itself
adequately explains a number of phenomena treated by psychoanalytic
theory as due to repression, defense, and unconscious thought pro-
cesses" (p. 331). This bold statement may advance either of two grand
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claims: (1) the concepts of repression, defense, and unconscious are
satisfactory for some purposes but have been extended over too large
an. area, or (2) these concepts are in themselves useless and can be
replaced with better ones drawn from a theory of translation levels.
The first claim seems valid, and Martindale's suggestions are pertinent,
to it. The second is invalid, and Martindale's article inadvertently dem-
onstrates its failing.
Psychoanalysis and the Study of Speech
Martindale begins his article with the following assertion:
If we consider the sorts of speech upon which psychoanalytic inferences
are based-e.g., free association in psychoanalytic interviews, dreams, slips
of the tongue, creative utterances, the speech of schizophrenics-it be-
comes clear that all are products of altered states of consciousness [po 3311.
This slightly ambiguous claim could mean either that all psychoana-
lytic inferences are based ultimately on the analysis of speech or, more
narrowly, that some analytic inferences are based on the analysis of
speech that is a product of altered states of consciousness. The first
explanation is certainly false. Clinical theory and clinical inference are
based on the observation of a patient's behavior, not just on his or her
speech. Beginning with Freud's reflection on Charcot and the ubiqui-
tous presence of Ie chose sexueI, psychoanalysts have observed behav-
ior as much as they have observed speech. Freud's (1895a) original
theory of sexual noxa and his choice of abreaction as a method of
treatment manifest his concern with physiological processes, not speech.
While he abandoned both this early theory and treatment, he did not
alter his essential technique-the naturalistic observation of human
behavior-both within the clinic and without.
The narrower explanation is partly true. Freud (1900) devoted The
Interpretation of Dreams to the analysis of dream reports, which, in
turn, refer to mental processes that take place during an altered state
of consciousness, sleep. Yet it is incorrect to say that all free associa-
tions are the products of any single element because, according to
Freud, they are compromise formations, Le., products of a multiple
interaction between conflicting systems (Kanzer 1972). Martindale's
thesis is more pertinent to Breuer's early theory of hypnoid states.
492 VOLNEY P. GAY
Breuer, not Freud, held that neurotic symptoms are formed when nor-
mal consciousness is altered and that hysteric ideation, cut off from
its usual associative connections, forms a condition seconde (Breuer &
Freud 1893-95, p. 15). Because this condition was engendered in an
altered state of consciousness, it followed that treatment should take
place in a similar state, one of light hypnosis induced by the physician.
As Rapaport (1957-59) notes, Breuer's technique was basically a re-
finement of the French theory that overcharged ideas, including sex-
ualized wishes, cannot be accommodated by a mental apparatus that
is at low ebb, e.g., in a hypnoid condition. Thus, Breuer viewed ther-
apeutic hypnosis as a way to safely discharge an overwrought emo-
tional capacitor.
Freud, of course, gingerly disengaged himself from Breuer when he,
confessed that "fresh points of view have forced themselves on my
mind" (Breuer & Freud 1893-95, p. 255). Among the views forced upon
him were his rejection of the hypnoid thesis, his discovery ofthe sexual
element in the etiology of neuroses, his elaboration of the talking cure,
and his rejection of Breuer's claim that retention hysterias were inde-
pendent clinical entities. Breuer's theory and treatment were physio-
logical; Freud's were psychological or, more exactly, psychoanalytic
because he linked motives to a sexual (libidinal) substrate.
I was able as little as anyone else to explain why it is that one person can
be hypnotized and another not, and thus I could not adopt a causal method
of meeting the difficulty. I noticed, however, that in some patients the
obstacle lay still further back: they refused even any attempt at hypnosis.
The idea then occurred to me one day that the two cases might be identical
and that both might signify an unwillingness; that people who were not
hypnotizable were people who had a psychical objection to hypnosis,
whether their objection was expressed as unwillingness or not [pp. 267-
68].
Using only his "pressure technique," Freud found that he could
force his patients to recover memories that had been unavailable. Hyp-
nosis was not necessary; his insistence was. From this clinical event
came his idea of resistance, and from the idea of resistance came the
idea of defense. What characterized these memories was not their gen-
esis in a hypnoid state, but their affective quality; "they were all of a
distressing nature, calculated to arouse the affects of shame, or self-
reproach and of psychical pain, and the feeling of being harmed; they
SEMIOTICS AS METAPSYCHOLOGY 493
were all of a kind one would rather forget" (p. 269). The painfulness
of everyday events, an indifferent parent, or a moment of sexual shame
marked these memories.
Although the nature of psychic pain is surprisingly obscure, even
after ~ghty years of psychoanalytic theory, its reality is not. Psychic
pain, which is one of the central features of neurotic illness, is both
the source of later neurotic behavior and the principal target of psy-
choanalytic therapy. Although related to physical pain, psychic pain
has one essential difference--the patient is responsible for its occur-
rence. The hypnoid state hypothesis dismisses the patient's complicity
in his or her pain by saying that symptoms come upon the patient
when he or she is in an altered state of consciousness and thus de-
fenseless.
Freud's (1900) psychoanalytic theory says exactly the opposite: the
patient is responsible for his or her suffering because, at a more pro-
, found level, the patient initiated the sequence of repression, defense,
and symptom formation by having a wish that, when fulfilled, "would
no longer generate an affect of pleasure but of unpleasure" (p. 604).
The general semiotic reading of Freud, including Lacan's (1949) her-
metic utterances, tends to glorify the intricacies and charm of uncon-
scious symbolization. This glorification distorts the core concept of
defense and fails to address Freud's point that "transformation of affect
... constitutes the essence of what we term 'repression' " (p. 604). That
psychic pain in its myriad forms of shame, guilt, depression, humili-
ation, anger, jealousy, loss, loneliness, and other forms of suffering is
the core problem may be seen in Freud's (Breuer & Freud 1893-95)
early comment on hysteria: "The hysterical patient's 'not knowing' was
in fact a 'not wanting to know'-a not wanting which might be to a
greater or less extent conscious" (pp. 269-70, italics mine). In other
words, repression has its genesis in a person's painful memories rather
than in an archaic part of the mind, in the "unconscious," or in prim-
itive language use.
Martindale's account of the theory of repression misrepresents Freud's
"discovery of a new range of facts" (Klein 1976, p. 239). His account
is essentially pre-Freudian; hence, it is compatible with Breuer's hyp-
noid state theory. Martindale's conception of the unconscious allows
for the preservation of the original narcissistic stance because it is not
"I" but some other self, an automatism, or some other internal, nonself
agent that is responsible for an individual's actions and suffering. Pre-
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Freudian dynamic psychiatrists and Jung explain emotional conflict in
primary-process terms: two agencies-the good self and the anima-
contend with one another for mastery of the body and hence the control
of the person's power. Jung's theory of subpersonalities is a modern
version of this ancient theory.
Freud cut through this chaotic theory, which multiplies agencies at
will, by positing that repression is a process in which the individual
distorts access to his or her own memory. Not only does Freud's po-
sition shatter the illusion that a person who suffers from neurosis is
simply the passive victim of the unconscious, but it also offers the
hope that such a person can recover sovereignty over those wishes and
hopes that were originally so dangerous.
Repression is, of course, a key part of the psychoanalytic shibboleth..
According to orthodox religionists and orthodox materialists, repres-
sion is an abomination because-like all central psychoanalytic con-
cepts-it unites antithetical categories of body and mind, energy and
language, and knowledge and ignorance. Freud held, however, that
there was no need to explain his patients' insights as the products of
a "momentarily intensified hypnosis," nor should one explain the orig-
inal act of repression as the product of an altered state of conscious-
ness. To propose the latter view is to propose a Breuerian, not a Freud-
ian, thesis.
Freud's View of Language and the Unconscious
Martindale (1975) asks a curious question: "Why ... did psycho-
analysis develop into a general theory of behavior rather than what we
shall argue that it should be, a grammar of associative or regressed
speech" (p. 331)? Since psychoanalysis began as a theory of behavior,
the question is slightly misleading. Nevertheless, Martindale's answer
is significant. According to Martindale, Freud's notion of unconscious
thought processes led him to believe that there were two streams of
thought operating at the same time and "that dreams and other pri-
mary-process manifestations represent a breakthrough of an ongoing
stream of unconscious mentation" (p. 332). Martindale likens this idea
to the manifestly absurd position that bilingual persons necessarily
speak both languages at the same time whenever they talk, one vocally
and the other subvocally. He proposes that the continuum of primary-
process and secondary-process functioning be viewed as a continuum
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of language. For example, a dream "has the form it has not because of
purposeful or motivated defense but because of the language of the
level at which it is conceived" (p. 332). This idea becomes plausible
only if one recasts the notion of primary process.
Fre~d's (1895b) first comments about primary process have nothing
to do with language or speech; instead, they relate to his larger thesis
about the affective basis of all thinking. Primary-process mentation is
neither a kind of speech nor a form of linguistic codification; rather, it
is an archaic form of cognition. Primary-process thinking occurs when
the ego automatically cathects representations of pleasure-giving ob-
jects and initiates discharge against that representation as if it were
the actual object, e.g., the breast. Martindale claims that Freud "as-
sumed that primary-process thought is continually present in the un-
conscious" (p. 332). This statement is a plausible summary of one part
of Freud's theory, but it distorts his larger thesis because it confuses
, thought with language and language with representation. At> a careful
reading of chapter six of The Interpretation of Dreams reveals, the
theory of primary and secondary processes is intimately tied to the
more fundamental theory of the economic point of view, which, in
turn, is tied to Freud's recognition of the centrality of psychic pain
and to the defense against pain through repression.
Freud (1900) does say that thinking may proceed "unobserved by
our consciousness" and "that the most complicated achievements of
thought are possible without the assistance of consciousness" (p. 593).
But Freud never says that unconscious mentation is akin to speaking
a language. On the contrary, Freud believes that thinking and language
use are two entirely distinct operations. Language entails thinking but
not vice versa; for example, Einstein and many other creative people
describe how they conceived of the most abstract relationships without
using any language (Prentky 1980). For Martindale to say that a bi-
lingual Frenchman speaks French as he is speaking English is absurd.
However, to say that a bilingual Frenchman conceives his ideas in
French or in pictures and describes them or formulates them in English
is not absurd. Thought is not identical to language use. Indeed, paint-
ing and dancing may be superior to language in their ability to express
deeply felt emotions (Arlow 1969).
Martindale is correct in saying that Freud's adherence to an econom-
ic point of view prevented him from reducing his metapsychology to
a grammar of archaic modes of speech. The theory of primary and
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secondary processes is a psychological theory of mentation that has
implications for a theory of language but is primarily an account of
the control of behavior. Primary-process ideation obeys the pleasure
principle; it aims automatically at the hallucinatory revival of the de-
sired object. Secondary-process ideation obeys the reality principle; it
requires first the postponement of discharge and then the testing of a
highly cathected idea against operations in the real world. Neither of
these processes requires the use of language. For example, after a pain-
ful encounter with a trap, a speechless wolf may learn to check his
initial urge to take the bait. The wolf's thinking is, therefore, in accor-
dance with secondary-process ideation (Gedo 1979). According to
Freud, human beings are mammals first, then language users. Psycho-
analysis is, in part, a theory of how human beings struggle to adapt
themselves to their mammalian heritage and how they fail. Restricting
psychoanalysis to the analysis of language emasculates it as a general
account of human action and prevents insight into mankind's wolflike
nature.
Defense Mechanisms
Martindale argues that "defenses and other phenomena of psycho-
analytic interest are seen as occurring only in regressed states. Just as
dreams occur only in sleep, a mechanism such as projection may occur
only in an altered state of consciousness" (pp. 332-33). The term al-
tered state of consciousness is as ambiguous as healthy and normal.
These terms imply a fixed notion of ordinary or normal and, conse-
quently, what is extraordinary and abnormal. Numerous problems arise
when any attempt is made to use these concepts in a rigorous way.
Even if one grants Martindale's ambiguous terminology a clinical
validity it usually lacks, his argument is faulty. If it is correct, Freud
(1900) is wrong both about the nature of free association (which Mar-
tindale ascribes to altered states of consciousness) and the nature of
"innocent dreams." Kanzer (1972) notes that the concept of free asso-
ciation developed with the concept of the fundamental rule: "The no-
tion that the former is a state of freely wandering thought can be upheld
only when the requirement that the patient share these thoughts with
the analyst through verbalization is left out of account" (p. 247). As
Freud stressed in his papers on technique, Kanzer emphasizes that free
association is a skill that must be acquired, often with great effort. The
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patient must endure this part of his "training" in order to assume more
and more responsibility for his own behavior. Kanzer relates this task
to the relatively unexplored superego dimensions of treatment, but it
is also rooted in the universal psychoanalytic value of truthfulness.
Mar\indale's thesis is in part correct. Primary-process ideation does
occur frequently in altered states of consciousness. But he is wrong to
conflate this fact with the task of free association. Indeed, his entire
argument is more appropriate to an explanation of Jung. Jung also
radicalized the experiential dichotomy between consciousness-every-
day feelings of self and self-responsibility-on the one hand, and un-
canny experiences of transport, awe, religious insight, and deperson-
alization on the other hand. Jung's own life is a paradigm of ego
splitting, reification, and intellectual repair. The brilliance with which
such people accomplish many of these repairs may be admirable, but
it should not be forgotten that this accomplishment requires the every-
, day ego of ordinary consciousness never to assume a position of au-
tonomy and coherence. The ego is always suspended between the in-
ward nonself entities (the archetypes) and the equally mysterious forces
of the outer world. Free association is typically Freudian because it
exemplifies Freud's fundamental ethic-seek the truth-and his fun-
damental goal-enlarge the realm of ego mastery.
Psychoanalytic clinical reconstructions are hypotheses about moti-
vation. In Waelder's (1962) terms, the analysis of motives is part of the
clinical theory; it is not derived from the rarified theorems of Freud's
metapsychological speculations. The patient and the therapist are re-
sponsible for uncovering the set of needs and wishes that gave rise to
the patient's symptoms. "The incentives and capacities for recovery
may be measured by this assumption of coresponsibility, as are the
adaptive potentials of the entire personality" (Kanzer 1972, p. 248).
The work of analysis, like the other kinds of work Freud constantly
refers to, is the labor the patient and therapist perform in overcoming
the patient's inclination to shift responsibility onto other people, other
parts of himself, or other states of consciousness. Since projection, like
other defense mechanisms, is a product of the ego's automatic response
to psychic pain, it is plausible to say that it occurs unconsciously. But
projection does not occur in an altered state of consciousness. During
the operation of a successful defense, the individual typically feels
quite normal. Although hysterical people may report dreamlike states,
obsessive people rarely do. Their more elaborated, ego syntonic defen-
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ses, such as reaction formation and idealization, come to characterize
normal consciousness. Indeed, one of the goals of the initial treatment
is to split the "seamless" consciousness of the obsessive patient and
make him aware of the automatisms underlying what are to him his
most virtuous characteristics. *
Restricting the notion of the unconscious to a type of consciousness
is another version of the topographic theory which does not permit the
therapist to analyze the surface phenomena of everyday life, e.g., nor-
mal dreams and innocent slips of the tongue. This restriction deeply
enervates Freud's conception of the dynamic unconscious by turning
it into a postulate about a place, a location, or a realm that is bordered
by consciousness. Although Freud's metaphors sometimes suggest this
notion, his theory, even chapter seven in The Interpretation of Dreams,
never does. In his critique of Jung, Glover (1950) argues that Jung
replaces Freud's dynamic theory with one of fixed personalities de-
fined by their relationship to consciousness. Glover's critique also per-
tains to Martindale's thesis. Both Martindale and Jung hold that what
is not available to immediate consciousness is necessarily "other-than-
self." Because the other-than-self is not part of the self (the willing
subject), motivation cannot be ascribed to it. If, in addition, neurotic
behavior is explained in terms of this kind of unconscious, it follows
that the subpersonalities or the unconscious rather than the self are
responsible for errors and faults. Hence, Jung frequently claims that
his theory relieves people of the guilty feelings that Freud's theory
ascribes to neurotic individuals. Martindale proposes a similar argu-
ment when he explains dreams in terms of regressive cognitive func-
tioning: "The dream has the form it has not because of purposeful or
motivated defense but because of the 'language of the level' at which
it is conceived" (p. 332).
If the concept of defense is reduced to a theory of regressed cogni-
tion, then it is impossible to analyze the ego as Freud advanced that
task in the last great period of his work. His subtle conception of the
ego's mastery of, yet dependence upon, repetition compulsion, his no-
tions of gradation of control and adaptive responses to the drives, and
his tragic view of life that grants human beings a measure of respon-
sibility for their fate are all obviated by collapsing the theory of the
* See Freud's (1909) comments on "two kinds of knowledge" (p. 196).
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ego into a theory of consciousness. Jung (1951) made this reduction
clear when he described the ego as simply that agency whose realm is
bounded by consciousness. He (1928) also stated the logical outcome
of such a theory: the aim of treatment is "the unconscious development
of a tqmspersonal control-point; a virtual goal, as it were, that ex-
pressed itself symbolically in a form which can only be described as
a vision of God" (p. 79). Martindale's characterization of the ego could
be debated further; however, his major constructive thesis identifies
primary-process ideation with a theory of semantic levels.
Defense as Language-Discourse Encoding
Martindale's central thesis is that Freud's concepts of defense (e.g.,
displacement, condensation, repression) can be replaced systematical-
ly with a general theory of the linguistic structure of primary-process
, ideation. As he notes, linguists and other theoreticians have developed
analyses of secondary-process thought; for example, Chomsky's work
on grammar is about the generation of well-formed sentences. Em-
ploying a general notion of language levels, Martindale seeks to ex-
plain apparent "defensive operations":
Suppose a dream is generated on level three [primitive level of semantic
differentiation]: the dream consists, e.g., of the image of swallowing in-
edible objects. In interpreting the dream, a depth psychologist essentially
wishes to rewrite it at some higher level. A number of possible rewrites
are possible on level five [a higher level of semantic differentiation]-e.g.,
'I imitate my mother,' 'I like my mother,' 'I like my father,' 'I swallow
feces,' 'I like my possessions' [po 344].
He concludes that the therapist's knowledge of the dreamer and the
dreamer's context will help reduce the number of possible rewrites.
His essential claim is that the dream image can be explained without
recourse to a defense of theory: "Given that the dreamer dreamed on
level three, the language of the level constrained the signs employed"
(p. 344).
Martindale's point seems true, as did Freud's (1900) similar thesis
when he distinguished between "thing presentations" and "word pre-
sentations," although Freud lacked a rigorous theory of language. Mar-
tindale's suggestions are also supported by Bateson's (1972) discus-
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sions of the iconic quality of primitive thought. Indeed, primary-process
ideation is essentially prelinguistic. Among the logical operators it
lacks are those Freud noted, including tense, voice, and agent. Martin-
dale agrees: "Level three discourse is fundamentally untranslatable;
one can only specify what the dreamer might have said had he talked
on level five rather than dreamed on level three" (p. 344).
However, Martindale's major argument, that linguistic theory can
explain what Freud ascribed to repression, is less plausible. Repres-
sion, according to this linguistic theory, is simply the result of a failure
to translate correctly between levels of representation.
Thus if a patient avoided the conclusion 'I act toward my wife as I acted
toward my mother,' he could be on a level where the verb 'act' or the
notion of 'similar' are unavailable. In such a regressed state, the patient
would be unable to see any analogous relations, not only the one specif-
ically avoided. The idea that 'falling apples and the moon both obey the
law of gravity' would be just as 'repressed' as the conclusion concerning
wife and mother [po 344].
At first reading, this sentence seems contradictory to Martindale's
earlier claims because he speaks here of the patient avoiding insight,
which is surely a defense against insight and exactly what Freudians
mean by repression and defense in general. Martindale must mean
only that this example is one of the analogous relations the patient
cannot conceive because he is in an altered state of consciousness.
Thus, Martindale's last point about "repressing" the knowledge of
gravity refers to the patient's altered state of consciousness. Is this idea
plausible? Can a modified topographic theory replace ego psychology?
Only, it would seem, if it can account for crucial facts unearthed in
the clinic.
Two such facts are the existence of resistance and parapraxes in
normal people. Although it is true that during intense episodes of
cognitive regression a patient will not be able to link subtle elements
of conceptual differentiation, not all instances of defense are products
of massive regression. Chief among them is resistance. A patient or
any other person will, Freud discovered, exhibit a systematic counter-
will or resistance when certain topics arise, e.g., masturbation, ho-
mosexuality, or the person's sister's successes.
L__-..............~ _
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The whole notion of interpretation, an element of the clinical theory,
requires the assumption that such "accidental" occurrences are highly
motivated and meaningful. Although a patient may feel a momentary
change in mood or "consciousness" when he lets his errant hat knock
over h~s mother-in-law's vase, the feeling of uncanniness (Freud 1919)
does not give rise to the action; the altered state of consciousness does
not produce the action; instead, the reverse occurs. I could recite ex-
amples without end, since they are among the fundamental observa-
tions of any analysis.
In the same way, Martindale's theory of altered states of conscious-
ness and massive regression cannot explain a similar, crucial fact of
normal behavior-parapraxes. The term altered state of consciousness
cannot mean something that is simply unavailable to everyday con-
sciousness, since that is what Freud means by the term unconscious.
How can the sudden appearance of a parapraxis be explained? In the
, famous example cited by Freud (1916-17) in which the president of
the assembly opened a new session by declaring it closed, Martindale
would have us conclude that: (1) the president suffered a massive shift
in consciousness, (2) his language capacity regressed from level five
to three (hence he lost the ability to distinguish negation from affir-
mation), and (3) he unwittingly uttered the reverse of his intention.
Not only are these explanations burdensome, they are impossible as
well. If the president had this kind of regression thrust upon him, his
entire "language use capacity" would be altered. Just as Martindale
explained the iconic quality of the entire dream by referring to the
grammar of level three discourse, we should expect to find the presi-
dent's entire utterance cast in level three mode, which is not so. To
save the theory, we would have to suppose that a "micro altered state
of consciousness" affecting only the word open caused the president
to utter its negation closed and then evaporated, leaving him in full
use of language five discourse. This explanation is implausible and,
when compared to Freud's analysis (that the president wanted to close
the session), inelegant. There are examples of full-fledged regression
that operate in the way Martindale suggests: one is dream imagery;
another is psychotic ideation, e.g., Jung's (1961) visions of the spirit
guides who visited him in his study. But as Freud and post-Freudian
analysts have made clear, these are examples of neither repression nor
defense, since the ego is overwhelmed and incapable of defense (Freud
1924a, 1924b).
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Martindale cannot account for the appearance of highly organized,
well-formed, syntactically valid, and meaningful parapraxes. For ex-
ample, in a speech to the National Federation of Republican Women
on September 28, 1973, John Connally defended Vice President Spiro
Agnew against charges of bribery. In passionate tones he said, "I, like
you, hope and pray that the facts are such that he's completely exon-
erated and that he is, indeed, found guilty."* Was Connally in an
. altered state of consciousness when he dropped the "not" from his
text? Viewing the videotape of the speech, one sees no indication of
either a change of tone or of mood. Connally was a possible successor
to Agnew, should the latter have to resign. Agnew's guilt, then, was
something obvious and fortuitous for Connally. His parapraxis was
completely intelligible as a barely suppressed wish, not as the produr;::t
of an altered state of consciousness.
Neither clinical theory, everyday experience, the phenomenology of
parapraxes, nor patient reports support Martindale's claim that "Freud-
ian mechanisms" occur only in regressed states of consciousness.
Summary and Conclusion
A purely semiotic metapsychology such as that proposed by Martin-
dale has a number of virtues:
1. If those mechanisms responsible for defense and insight are pri-
marily verbal or structured around verbal processing, then a semiotic
metapsychology would account for the success of verbal treatment.
2. It would allow psychoanalysts to employ the insights and tech-
niques of the various linguistic disciplines, e.g., phonology, artificial
intelligence, computer simulations.
3. Psychoanalysis would then take its place among the unified sci-
ences of meaning in the university curriculum.
4. It avoids the problems of the mind-body debate, since it situates
psychoanalytic practice and science within the realm of language in
general.
5. It also reduces irrational elements, like force and desire, to products
or by-products of normal functioning. In general, a semiotic meta-
* New York Times, September 29, 1973, Section L, p. 14.
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psychology, of the type that Martindale, Bruss (1976), and others pro-
pose, would tend to demystify both psychoanalytic theory and psy-
choanalytic practice.
HoweVler, the clarity gained must be measured alongside the hidden
costs:
1. A purely semiotic metapsychology is unable to account for the na-
ture of motivation ("the drives") and unconscious intentionality.
2. It fails to give a clinically accurate account of the central dynamic
mechanism of repression.
3. It cannot account for "ego splits"-a purely semiotic theory cannot
explain the existence of neurotic experts, e.g., well-educated psychi-
atrists who, in the face of their technique and knowledge, remain de-
I pressed or even suicidal (Klein 1976).
4. It gives no account of psychic pain, a central feature of neurotic and
normal functioning, e.g., although Freud's energy constructs explain-
ing depression may not be satisfactory, he at least places such dis-
pleasures within the realm of clinical and metapsychological theories.
5. It reduces the psychoanalytic field to an account of language or
languagelike products of human actions and fails to comprehend the
possibilities of a psychoanalytic theory of behavior that is not repre-
sentational.
This fifth point is the most crucial one because semioticians in general
tend to conflate psychoanalysis proper with its usual set of interpre-
tation theories. * From a humanist's point of view, psychoanalysis seems
to be about nothing other than unconscious ideas, hidden meanings,
cryptograms, rebuses, puzzles, and other kinds of rhetorical and lin-
guistic devices.t Because the mysteries of language are, in a sense, the
subject matter of the humanities, the attractions exerted by a semiotic
metapsychology are powerful. Should we resist them?
Martindale recognizes these problems. He elaborates the notion of
levels of discourse in order to account for the depth elements in psy-
choanalytic interpretation. Yet even that gambit runs into the intrac-
* Cf. Ricoeur (1970) and Habermas (1972).
tHence, Lacan's advice that young analysts should do crossword puzzles.
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table problem of signification. How are we to understand the leap from
somatic automatisms to linguisticlike representations? To this bona
fide problem, many articulate philosophers have given many articulate
answers. But what of those forms of human suffering that are not sym-
bolized or presented in language?
Kohut (1977) describes this kind of suffering as a primary dread of
the dissolution of the self. His notion of two types of dreams illustrates
that accepting or rejecting all of his extensive theory of self is not
essential in order to see that many forms of pathology reflect preverbal
and even predifferentiation trauma.
Dreams of this second type portray the dreamer's dread vis-a.-vis some
uncontrollable tension-increase or his dread of the dissolution of the self.
The very act of portraying these vicissitudes in the dream constitutes an
attempt to deal with the psychological danger by covering frightening,
nameless processes with nameable visual imagery [po 109, italics mine].
Consequently, he claims, one finds that interpretation of such dreams
does not yield a secret message. There is no underlying cryptogram,
no single sentence (Bruss 1976) which, when deciphered, will yield
the key to a dream's meaning.
In reply, a Lacanian could argue that the lack of "depth" elements
in these dreams, their obviousness, is just an indication (sign) of a
more profound kind of representation-the representation of nothing-
ness, that very form of existence which most terrifies the traumatized
narcissist. Kohut (1977) contributes to this argument when he suggests
there is a "Rosetta-Stone principle" that "embodies the view that the
validity of newly discovered meanings (or their significance) must be
established in analogy to the validation procedure employed in the
deciphering of hieroglyphics" (p. 144). More so, he goes on to say,
"The essential focus of interest of the psychoanalyst ... concerns the
meaning and the significance of the material under scrutiny, rather
than causal sequences" (p. 145).
This focus is true in classical analyses of the structural neuroses,
especially those most closely linked to oedipal conflicts. But it appears
incorrect to say that Kohut's own work with narcissistic characters has
this focus. Indeed, Kohut argues that children of psychoanalysts ex-
hibit a particular kind of self-pathology because their sophisticated
parents "tended to interfere with the consolidation of the self of these
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children" (p. 147). He identifies a causal sequence, as he does in most
of his theorems, e.g., "it was a deep fear of the dissolution of the self
that had prompted them to wall themselves off against the danger of
being understood" (p. 148, italics mine). Indeed, the central argument
in both Vf his major works (1971,1977) is that there are inborn, species-
specific self-nuclei that exist anterior to the development of the libid-
inal drives and that must be accommodated within an average expect-
able environment of empathic adult relationships. * These statements
are all causal, as are his extensive remarks on narcissistic transferences.
Therefore, Kohut must be describing his philosophical and methodo-
logical understanding of how theory advances, rather than his meta-
psychology of the development of human beings. Thus, he notes that
his conceptualization of a new self psychology "leads to a psychoana-
lytic rather than educational approach" (p. 149).
Kohut's work is valuable because it exhibits and articulates new
insights about the causes of human behavior. Those insights were not
produced out of linguistic reflection or academic debate. A linguistic
metapsychology is seductive because it entails the thesis, uttered sotto
voce, that the core of human existence is fundamentally knowable and
describable because it is fundamentally linguistic. This thesis is not
true. The drive theory, with all its awkwardness, does not permit us
to escape that unhappy fact.
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